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This paper reviews evidence of the gender effects of globalization in developing economies. It 
then outlines a set of macroeconomic and trade policies to promote gender equity. The evidence 
suggests that while liberalization has expanded women’s access to employment, the long-term 
goal of transforming gender inequalities remains unmet and appears unattainable without state 
intervention in markets. This paper sets forth some general principles that can produce greater 
gender equality, premised on shifting from economies that are profit led and export oriented to 
those that are wage led and full-employment oriented. The framework is Kaleckian in its focus 
on the relationship between the gender distribution of income and macroeconomic outcomes.   
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last two decades, a number of development economists have critically assessed 
mainstream trade and growth strategies, propelled by a concern with persistent gender 
inequality. That body of work explores the linkages between macro-level policies and the 
gender distribution of resources and responsibilities at the micro-level. Research underscores 
that macro-level policies can hinder or help achieve gender equity, and that gender inequities, in 
turn, can promote or hamper the attainment of macroeconomic objectives. There is thus a two-
way causality between macroeconomic variables and gender equity.  
This paper reviews that research, drawing attention to insights that can inform strategies 
for shaping macro policy in a way that enables gender equity. This is followed by an effort to 
outline the broad contours of gender-equitable macro policy. This is a difficult task, given wide 
variations in types of economies, institutional mechanisms, and cultural forces that reinforce 
gender inequalities. Nonetheless, there are some generalizable approaches alongside more 
specific policy proposals for countries at different levels of development.  
Briefly summarizing the conclusions of this paper, to achieve the combined goals of 
improving women’s relative well-being and promoting economic growth requires policies that 
can shift a “profit-led” export-oriented economy to one that is wage-led. The strategy we outline 
has three components at the national level: 1) industrial and agricultural development, coupled 
with trade policies to shift production to emphasize price-inelastic goods and services; 2) 
restrictions on flows of physical and financial capital; and 3) fiscal and monetary policies 
sensitive to the goal of gender equity. This strategy requires shifts at the international level as 
well, including the expansion of “special and differential treatment” of developing countries in 
trade agreements, demand management policies to stimulate growth in developed economies, 
and regional coordination to ensure domestic benefits from foreign direct investment.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the goal of gender equity and 
provides a feminist-Kaleckian perspective on desirable macroeconomic outcomes. Section 3 
examines gender outcomes in employment, wages, and job quality as well as macroeconomic 
conditions in the recent period of globalization. Section 4 advances a set of feminist-Kaleckian 
policies to promote greater gender equity. Section 5 elucidates the “value-added” of a feminist 
approach to post-Keynesian theory, and Section 6 concludes. 
1 2. GENDER EQUITY AS A MACROECONOMIC GOAL 
 
The unequal distribution of income and resources, and in particular, gender inequality, is a 
central concern in the quest to improve well-being. This is because economic inequality can 
contribute to or perpetuate various forms of unfreedoms—such as discrimination, social 
intolerance, and lack of political power— that inhibit the acquisition of individual capabilities 
(Sen 1999). Freedoms are intertwined and any feminist agenda for gender-equitable macro 
policies would benefit from a move for simultaneous change in other arenas as well, such as the 
political.
1 The goal here, however, is more modest—to consider how the gender distribution of 
income, wealth, and labor might be made more equitable, understanding that greater equity in 
the distribution of material resources can be a fulcrum for change in other domains.  
A gender equitable economy requires policies to achieve several important goals. First, 
equitable access to jobs is required through elimination of discriminatory employment barriers. 
Second, equity in earnings is needed, with both women and men able to earn living wages—
wages sufficiently high to permit adults to adequately provision for their families.
2 Provisioning 
for families requires relatively secure income sources. Women are frequently breadwinners, but 
even when part of two-adult households, secure earnings are an important means to improve 
their bargaining power to negotiate for an equitable distribution of resources and unpaid labor. 
A further requirement is equitable distribution of state resources that close gender gaps in 
economic and social well-being, such as access to health, education, basic infrastructure, and 
other public goods, to redress market and social gender inequalities.  
With these goals in mind, this paper seeks to delineate a set of macro-level policies 
capable of producing high-quality growth and development, where quality is defined as the 
capacity for policies to close gender gaps without necessarily lowering men’s average well-
being. This approach differs from the mainstream, which sees the goal of macroeconomic and 
trade policies as price stability, the elimination of barriers to trade, sustainable debt, and for the 
more Keynesian, full employment. That is, both mainstream and Keynesian goals are defined 
without a view to addressing the problem of gender inequality in well-being. Rather, policies 
that might promote gender equality are most often an afterthought.  Further, some mainstream 
and Keynesian policies that promote growth actually preclude or make gender equity more 
difficult to achieve. Thus, it is necessary to start with the explicit goal of promoting gender 
2 equity in well-being, and then proceed to an examination of the policy options consistent with 
that goal in the context of a particular economic structure and set of international institutions.
3  
Given this context, several questions are explored in this paper. Under what conditions 
can women’s income be raised, while at the same time promoting economic growth? In other 
words, what policies can shift a profit-led export-oriented economy to one that is more wage-
led? Further, how can this be done while retaining the benefits of openness that afford 
developing countries access to sophisticated technology that can raise productivity in the home 
country and validate higher wages? 
 
3. THE CONTEXT: GENDERED EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION AS MARKET 
LIBERALIZATION 
 
An examination of the gender effects of globalization and neo-liberal policies that have led to 
trade and financial market liberalization is a starting point for assessing the policies for 
promoting gender equity. In this section, we consider the gendered employment effects of 
liberalization, the impact of globalization on macroeconomic performance, and shifts in the 
state’s economic role in provision of a social safety net and in development planning. 
 
(a) Gendered Employment and Earnings Effects 
Much has been made of women’s increased participation in paid labor activities over the last 40 
years. These trends, though not universally observed (Antecol 2000), underscore the increased 
opportunities that globalization has provided for women. 
 
Gender and job access 
Globalization has propelled women into labor markets in economies of varying structures. 
Semi-industrialized economies that emphasize export manufacturing have experienced a rise in 
the female share of employment, especially in the early phases of industrialization. Women have 
been largely “crowded” into labor-intensive export manufacturing, facing both explicit and 
implicit restrictions on their access to more skill-intensive jobs in non-tradeable fix-price 
industries
4 (Nam 1991; Hsiung 1996; Seguino 1997a; Standing 1989, 1999; Mehra and 
Gammage 1999; Ozler 2000).
5 Women provide a cost advantage to firms facing severe cost 
competition from other export-oriented economies. The attractiveness of female workers is also 
3 related to the ease of shedding these workers, based in part on gender norms that relegate 
women’s paid work to secondary importance after their reproductive responsibilities.  
Over time, as semi-industrialized economies mature, the process of feminization of 
export employment may decline or even reverse.
6 In Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and 
Singapore—that is, among the East Asian “tigers”—as well as in Mexico’s maquiladoras, 
women’s share of manufacturing employment has fallen in recent years. Defeminization appears 
attributable to be the dual process of tight female labor markets that lead to upward pressure on 
female wages and the emergence of lower wage sites in Asia and Latin America. This cost 
squeeze has led to industrial restructuring in mature semi-industrialized economies (SIEs) with 
manufacturing production shifting to a greater emphasis on skill-intensive goods. It is not clear 
why women should be impeded from entering skill-intensive industries, as educational gaps are 
narrowing in many countries. One possibility is that firms prefer to invest in training for male 
workers, consistent with the view that men deserve the more secure employment and are less 
likely to leave paid work to fulfill domestic responsibilities. Women displaced from 
manufacturing have found employment in service jobs, which have expanded as a share of total 
output, such that female shares of employment have in fact declined only in the manufacturing 
sector (Mehra and Gammage 1999).  
An exception to the trend of feminization of employment has been in those developing 
economies with less competitive manufacturing sectors, particularly in Africa. Trade 
liberalization forced these economies to reduce tariffs on imports of labor-intensive 
manufactures such as clothing, resulting in job losses for women who outnumbered male 
workers in the garment industry. Many laid-off workers have been pushed into informal 
employment. The evidence is not clear on whether women are disproportionately hurt by this 
shift from formal to informal work since male-dominated industries have also been affected.  It 
is clear though that women as well as men have experienced income declines and increased job 
insecurity in the shift to informal employment, a topic that is discussed below. Apart from these 
exceptions, the dominant experience has been one of increased openings for women in a limited 
set of jobs in export manufacturing sectors. 
In agriculturally-oriented developing economies that have emphasized exports of cash 
crops as part of their liberalization strategy, women have increased job opportunities as seasonal 
or contract workers or as laborers on husbands’ or relatives’ land in the production of export 
cash crops.
7 In some cases, such as Latin America, economic restructuring, crisis, and 
4 globalization has led to the feminization of agriculture as women seek remunerative 
employment to supplement declining family income (Deere 2004).  Some women have become 
producers of non-traditional agricultural exports (NTAEs). In Latin America and South Africa, 
NTAEs are often produced on large-scale enterprises, with women forming up to 80 percent of 
the workforce (Carr, Chen, and Tate 2000).  
Finally, in developing economies that rely heavily on service exports to propel growth 
(such as informatics and tourism), we observe that here too women are a large share of export 
workers (UNDP1999; Davison and Sanchez-Taylor 1999; Freeman 2000). An additional though 
perhaps unintentional form of service sector export labor is that of workers who emigrate to 
work as nurses and domestics, remitting income to family members at home, and thus 
generating foreign exchange for the home economy.
8 The large majority of these workers are 
female (UNDP 1999).   
Paradoxically, a number of countries also have very high relative rates of female 
unemployment. Unemployment data are of questionable use due to measurement problems.
9 
However, the case of Caribbean economies is one where the data provide a more accurate 
picture of women’s and men’s job access, due to the way unemployment is measured.
10 
Women’s unemployment rates there remain almost double men’s already very high rates.
11  
Similarly, in transition economies, women have experienced declines in access to jobs relative 
to men (Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick 1996).  
In sum, the clustering of women in export industries suggests the “feminization of 
foreign exchange earnings,”
12 as countries increasingly rely on export earnings to purchase 
needed imports and to service external debts. While women are preferred workers in price-
elastic export industries, they continue to face difficulties in gaining access to jobs that are more 
secure in non-tradables industries. Further, when there are job shortages, women are sent to the 
back of the job queue.  
 
Gender and conditions of employment 
Employment has become increasingly flexible in the recent process of globalization as 
employers attempt to reduce costs (Standing 1989, 1999). A notable trend is the expanded use of 
women as subcontracted or home workers in manufacturing.
13 Ghosh (2002) provides evidence 
for India that the trend towards casualization, in the form of subcontracting and home 
production, was evident before the Asian financial crisis, highlighting the competitive pressures 
5 amongst firms to lower costs in the context of an increasing number of suppliers (e.g., China, 
and post-NAFTA, Mexico) vying for access to developed country markets. The trend extends to 
the agricultural sector where trade liberalization has created seasonal employment in the area of 
agricultural exports (UNDP 1999; Deere 2004). In the case of Chilean and South African export 
grape industries, women are the preferred source of temporary workers and hold a small share 
of permanent jobs (Barrientos 2001). 
This trend is due in part to the continued adherence to a “male breadwinner” bias, which 
slots women for insecure jobs or home work.
14 Men are affected by these trends as well, as the 
jobs they hold take on the character of women’s jobs (temporary or casual status, limited job 
mobility, few or no benefits), but the percentage of women in “flexible” jobs greatly exceeds 
that of men (UNDP 1999). For that reason, women’s increased incorporation into the paid 
economy is under conditions inferior to those necessary to provide them with secure income. 
The types of jobs they have access to constrain their ability to raise their incomes and improve 
their working conditions, and come at a high cost.
15 The seasonality of agricultural jobs, for 
example, implies there are no sustained improvements in women’s employment status. 
 
Gender, wages, and income 
The evidence on earnings suggests that we might well add gender wage inequality to the list of 
universal if not inevitable human events, along with taxes and death. This state of circumstances 
persists despite the feminization of labor which was predicted to portend well for women’s 
relative wages—rising demand for female labor should drive up their wages relative to men’s. 
Some studies indicate a narrowing of gender wage gaps in some countries (Tzannatos 1999; 
World Bank 2001; Oostendorp 2002),
16 although in other countries, gaps have widened 
(Standing 1989, 1999; Mehra and Gammage 1999; Artecona and Cunningham 2002; Berik, 
Rodgers, and Zveglich 2004). The case of the East Asian “tigers” is instructive. Despite rapid 
growth in exports that relied on female labor, gender wage gaps remain persistently large, and 
have worsened in some cases (Seguino 1997b).   
In agricultural work, female earnings lag men’s substantially as well. The distribution of 
benefits in the Chilean grape industry underscores the disadvantaged position of female 
workers. For seedless grapes produced in 1993-94, producers accounted for 11 percent of costs 
(of which 5 percent went to workers), while exporters received 28 percent, importers 26 percent, 
and distributors 35 percent (Barrientos et al. 1999). The bargaining power of capital vis-à-vis 
6 workers is revealed in this type of global value chain analysis, highlighting the difficulty of 
raising women’s relative wages in this type of employment. 
There are some exceptions to the negative picture we have drawn of the effect of 
globalization on women’s relative earnings in the agricultural sector. Women’s earnings have 
improved in some cases of NTAE production where they have access to or control over land. 
One such case is Uganda (Fontana, Joekes, and Masika 1998) although this enlarged area of 
economic activity for women does not appear to have disturbed the wide gender gap in earnings 
in other sectors of the economy where women’s wages are roughly 40 percent below those of 
men (Appleton, Hoddinott, and Krishnan 1996).
17
A variety of forces militate against closure of the gender earnings gap. Women in semi-
industrialized economies are “crowded” in labor-intensive export industries—precisely the ones 
with the lowest sunk costs and which thus tend to be more “mobile.” Physical capital mobility 
produces a “threat effect” that makes it difficult for women to obtain higher wages. Firm 
mobility also makes it easier for firms to appropriate the gains of productivity growth. In the 
case of Bangladesh’s female-dominated garment industry, Bhattacharya and Rahman (1999) 
found, for example, that profit margins increased from 13 percent to 24 percent in the early 
1990s as productivity rose, with the wage share of value-added falling.  
Rodrik (1997) describes this phenomenon in terms of a flattened labor demand curve, 
made more elastic by the emergence of alternative labor supplies beyond the domestic economy. 
Workers bear the costs of increased capital mobility in the form of lower wages. Seguino 
(2000b) finds evidence of this effect in the case of Taiwan where the gender wage gap widened 
in the period 1982-90. The increase in total FDI (the absolute value of the sum of inward and 
outward FDI), which reflects greater firm mobility, appears to have weakened women’s relative 
bargaining power.
18  
A second phenomenon that inhibits closure of the gender wage gap is the informalization 
of labor contracts through the process of subcontracting and outsourcing. Workers in these 
arrangements, as noted, are largely women. Because of their unstable work arrangements and 
isolation, they face greater difficulties in bargaining for higher wages than formal sector 
workers. There is evidence that wages in this type of employment are significantly lower than 
for workers similarly employed in the formal sector (Roh 1990; Kabeer 2000; Balakrishnan 
2002). The gender wage gap is thus probably even wider than the official figures imply, because 
wages of home workers often go unrecorded in official surveys. Further, low wages in this 
7 sector are likely to hold down wage gains for women employed in other sectors that provide 
residual employment. 
There is some evidence that gender wage inequality is functional to growth with gender 
gaps in earnings positively related to growth rates of GDP in SIEs where women are segregated 
in export manufacturing industries (Seguino 2000a, 2000c).
19 Under those conditions, efforts to 
close the wage gap without countermeasures to offset the negative effect on export demand will 
slow growth, putting gender equity and economic growth at odds. In light of all these factors, 
evidence of rising profit shares of income in numerous economies is not surprising. Thus an 
important effect of globalization is a redistribution from labor to capital as economies become 
more profit-led. 
  
Effects on gender inequality in leisure and caring labor  
Theoretically, job access for women can improve their level of well-being and that of the 
children they care for—if this provides more income, and if women can find a way to juggle 
their care responsibilities (or if men take on more unpaid care work). Time use data are sparse, 
and in particular, trend data are lacking. What little evidence is available suggests that women’s 
time burdens have increased with globalization. Further, studies such as Floro (1995) indicate 
that the time intensity of women’s labor has increased. Men’s performance of unpaid labor does 
not appear to have increased enough to compensate, suggesting a decline in female leisure.  
To date, there is little research that examines the long-term effects on women’s well-
being and empowerment of their increased employment access. Are there measurable effects 
that show up in measures of well-being or household bargaining power? We need to answer this 
question in order to determine whether economic and trade liberalization provide the conditions 
for women to achieve equitable standards of living and power with men over time, even if 
women’s incorporation into the labor force in the short term is under unfavorable—and indeed 
exploitative—conditions.  
Some studies find that as women’s access to outside income rises, they are better able to 
renegotiate the distribution of resources within the household to the benefit of themselves and 
their children. The source and stability of that income appears to play a role in influencing 
women’s bargaining power. For example, Kabeer’s (2000) study of Bangladeshi garment 
workers found that women employed as home workers with insecure and intermittent earnings 
8 were less able to renegotiate their position in patriarchal households than women with higher 
and more stable earnings.   
One study considers these questions for Asian economies where rapid growth was fueled 
by low-cost female labor in a period of otherwise global economic stagnation (Seguino 2002a). 
A variety of well-being indicators suggest there has been some closure of gender gaps in quality 
of life, but those countries that have improved the most were the slowest growing in the region 
and the least successful as “open” economies. In the case of South Korea, a disturbing trend has 
been the declining ratio of females to males in the population. This measure can be viewed as an 
indicator of society’s valuation of women. Women’s access to paid employment has apparently 
not resulted in sufficient leverage to alter gender perceptions that devalue women. This result 
leads to the question of whether the conditions under which women are incorporated into the 
paid economy are adequate to eventually transform conditions of gender inequality into gender 
equity. 
 
(b) Macroeconomic Effects of Globalization 
The macroeconomic effects of globalization on gender equality can be subdivided into two 




In the context of globalization, external factors increasingly determine the level of output and 
employment, while the importance of domestic demand is lessened. Trade liberalization raises 
the share of exports and imports in demand. Further, investment liberalization that facilitates 
inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) requires domestic economies to compete 
with conditions, including labor costs, in other countries.  
These changes alter the relationship between income distribution and growth. In 
particular, as external factors have a larger effect on aggregate demand, economies are more 
likely to become profit-led—redistribution to profits raises output and employment (You 1989; 
Bhaduri and Marglin 1990). This is because higher wages, once a benefit in the form of a 
demand-side stimulus in more closed economies (assuming spending out of wage income 
exceeds spending out of profit income), now have a potentially negative demand-side effect on 
9 exports and investment demand. This negative effect is based on an assumption that wage 
increases do not affect labor productivity.  
Thus, while liberalization may result in a demand-side stimulus if exports and 
investment rise, this can only occur if wage growth is constrained, particularly the wages of 
those employed in “mobile” export industries. Women are more adversely affected as they tend 
to be disproportionately concentrated in industries where vertical FDI dominates. Vertical FDI, 
as compared to horizontal FDI, implies production for export rather than sale to the domestic 
economy. Vertical FDI implies the firm goal of taking advantage of differences in factor costs 
among countries, concentrating labor-intensive activities in those countries with lower labor 
costs (Kucera 2001).
20  
Financial market liberalization can also produce negative demand-side effects. Four 
effects are especially important for gender relations: 1) balance of payments difficulties, 2) 
constraints on use of monetary policy, leading to slower rates of growth, 3) increased economic 
volatility, and 4) reduced latitude for use of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool.  Regarding the 
first, the inflow of financial capital raises the demand for imports. If inflows are too rapid, 
inflation and exchange rate appreciation may result, leading to balance of payments difficulties, 
particularly if inflows are directed toward non-productive expenditures such as luxury goods 
and real estate speculation. The result may be a contraction of aggregate demand. Beyond the 
short-run effect of balance of payments difficulties and tendencies toward stagnation, in the 
longer run, sustaining a trade deficit causes external debt to build up, leading to capital flight 
and a financial crisis if it becomes seen as unsustainable (Bhaduri 1999).  
Second, financial liberalization can contribute to a decline in growth rates. Liberalization 
permits investors to cross borders to seek out the highest rate of return on financial instruments, 
leading monetary authorities to raise interest rates in an effort to establish credibility with 
financial markets. The cumulative effect is that globally, interest rates have been ratcheted 
upward and are historically high (Eatwell 1996; Felix 1998).
21 High interest rates, it is argued, 
have contributed to a slowdown in economic growth and employment generation. A further 
effect of financial liberalization is economic volatility, as seen in the 1990s. Financial panics, 
more common in the age of elimination of capital controls, can lead to rapid capital outflows, 
sharp declines in asset prices, bankruptcies, and recession as evidenced by events in Mexico in 
1994 and Asia in 1997.  
10 Finally, because fiscal deficits are interpreted by financial markets to be inflationary, 
governments are constrained in their policy instruments for stimulating output and employment. 
Deficit spending increasingly becomes difficult to manage without precipitating a capital 
outflow, to which countries respond by raising interest rates. The pressure to reduce state 
spending is increased as footloose capital gains increased leverage to bargain for lower tax rates 
as a condition of investment (Tanzi 1995; Poterba 1997).
22 If spending levels are to be 
maintained, taxes must be borne by the immobile factor, labor, while taxes on the mobile factor 
fall. Thus, there is a tendency toward reduction of government spending, and a redistribution of 
the burden of that spending from capital to labor (Wallerstein and Przeworski 1995). In sum, the 
traditional tools of fiscal and monetary policy are constrained by financial markets that veto 
budget deficits and demand high interest rates.  
The net effect of these processes has been a slowdown in economic growth globally 
(Maddison 1995). These demand-side pressures that produce a deflationary bias have made it 
difficult for countries to overcome chronically high rates of unemployment.  
Because women are more likely than men to be unemployed, the difficulties of 
stimulating growth and employment in open economies weigh more heavily on them. It thus 
appears that a major vehicle for improving gender equity—increasing women’s relative access 
to jobs—is increasingly unobtainable in the era of globalization.  Moreover, the gender effects 
of financial crises have been well-documented. Lim (2000)  and Singh and Zammit (2002) note 
that in some Asian countries (Indonesia and South Korea), women were the first to lose their 
jobs during the financial crisis. Women thus not only provided the unpaid work that was critical 
to family and community survival, but also bore a disproportionate increase in unemployment. 
 
The shifting role of the state  
Economic and trade liberalization have contributed to restrictions on state intervention in the 
economy in two important arenas (in addition to demand management policies discussed 
above)—the provision of a social safety net and the reduction in tools required for states to 
promote development and productivity growth.  
Reduction in the provision of social services is related to the pressure on states to 
eliminate budget deficits. This pressure, as noted above, is due to financial market liberalization, 
stabilization and structural adjustment policies, and declining corporate tax contributions. Of 
course, even prior to the current period of liberalization, entitlement programs to a greater or 
11 lesser degree differentially benefited full-time workers—mainly males. Temporary or part-time 
workers, and those who spend time in unpaid labor—largely women—have had less coverage.  
This problematic has been exacerbated by cuts in social expenditures such as health care, 
education, food, and housing subsidies and the imposition of user charges for public services 
which low-income women especially have relied on for ensuring the health and educational 
needs of children.
23 As a result, women, who act as the economic “shock absorbers” face 
increasing demands on their time with labor effort rising to maintain family well-being in order 
to accommodate the decline in public services.   
The ability of states to intervene in the development process to promote higher value 
added production activities has also narrowed. Countries have been under pressure to privatize 
domestic industries and to relinquish the tools of industrial/agricultural policy. This trend has 
been accompanied by trade and investment agreements (institutionalized in the WTO) which 
require governments to liberalize trade, drop preferential treatment of domestic firms, and allow 
unrestricted foreign direct investment. These conditions make it increasingly difficult to pursue 
policies that would support domestic producers, providing them with the resources needed to 
move up the industrial ladder to more skill-intensive goods production where prices are more 
inelastic and which are not facing declining terms of trade.
 24 Further, a number of countries 
have made central banks independent of government, limiting their ability to use preferential 
lending as a means to support the growth of strategic manufacturing, service, or agricultural 
industries.  
In agriculturally-based economies, such as a number of African economies, investment 
is public sector-led. Public sector spending on infrastructure can “crowd in” private sector 
spending, acting as a stimulus to productivity growth, due in part to market failures where 
farmers lack access to resources, such as credit and training. Constraints on public investment 
have gendered effects in a number of African economies, where women comprise the bulk of 
farmers. Cuts in infrastructure investments and restrictions on the use of formerly public 
resources owing to privatization has led to an increase in women’s unpaid labor burden, 
inhibiting their participation in paid activities.
25 Further, agriculturally-based economies, 
wedded to the production of export commodities with falling terms of trade, require government 
investment to improve the productive capacity of small, largely female farmers in order to raise 
income. 
12 In sum, then, while the structural conditions of semi-industrialized and agricultural 
economies differ, they share a reliance on export goods for which the terms of trade are 
worsening, and the decreasing ability of the state to use tools of industrial or agricultural policy 
due to pressures to privatize and reduce government spending. 
 
4. FEMINIST MACROECONOMIC POLICIES TO PROMOTE GENDER EQUITY 
 
The challenges to the achievement of gender equity in the context of globalization can be 
summarized as follows. With trade liberalization, some women in developing economies have 
had expanded access to employment, improving short-term incomes.  For paid work to raise 
women’s status, however, it must provide a secure income and rising wages relative to men’s. 
But females are concentrated in unstable, low paid dead- end manufacturing jobs—a 
phenomenon mirrored in service and agricultural sectors of developing economies (UNDP 
1999; Barrientos 2001). Thus, the types of jobs that many women hold, particularly those in 
export sectors, do not possess the characteristics that would allow them to achieve equity. 
The contradiction is that while women’s low wages motivate employers to hire them, 
attempts to raise wages lead to a decline in employment as firms relocate production. Increases 
in productivity might ratify wage hikes, but firms are not pressured to raise productivity because 
wages are so low. Wage hikes cannot stimulate improvements in productivity since the mobility 
of firms makes it difficult for efficiency wage effects to emerge. Further, these jobs tend to be 
flexible, reducing the incentive for employers to invest in worker training.  
The insecurity of jobs that women hold can, in theory, be offset by appropriately 
designed social safety nets. The goal of gender equity would be further assisted by full-
employment policies and a reduction in economic volatility. These conditions are not met in the 
current environment due to constraints on public spending and financial liberalization that have 
resulted in slow growth and an increase in the variance of output and employment.  
Given this context, what macro-level policies should feminists advocate to promote 
equity in the medium- to long-run?  First, such a policy framework should include promotion of 
the type of development consistent with full employment and in which economies are wage-led 
with rising productivity. By full employment, we refer to the absence of involuntary 
unemployment and involuntary part-time or informal employment. Our usage of the term full 
employment differs from the standard usage, which often ignores unpaid labor, as well as the 
13 level of pay.
26 It would not be ideal to promote full employment (i.e., the eradication of 
unemployment and underemployment) without a concomitant increased sharing of unpaid labor 
by men, so that women’s access to paid work could be offset by a reduction in unpaid labor.  
Second, by wage-led growth, we refer to the set of structural, policy, and institutional conditions 
in which a redistribution to wages from profits is a stimulus to growth.  
Full employment that produces labor shortages can make it easier for women to access 
employment in male-dominated industries that pay higher wages, facilitating job integration and 
narrower wage gaps. The movement toward full-employment also helps to put upward pressure 
on women’s wages by tightening labor markets. For this strategy to work, however, economies 
must be wage-led—that is, redistribution to wages must be a stimulus to output and growth, thus 
ratifying higher relative female wages. 
 
(a) Income Distribution and Growth 
The promotion of full-employment wage-led growth in open economies is in essence a problem 
of the relationship between income distribution and macroeconomic outcomes, explored in 
recent years by neo-Kaleckian economists.
27 In these models, some components of aggregate 
demand are a function of the distribution of income and the models explore the macroeconomic 
conditions necessary for redistribution from profits to wages (via, for example, a higher 
minimum wage or increased worker bargaining power) to stimulate output and growth.  
While most neo-Kaleckian models are not gendered, it is possible to engender these 
models by incorporating gendered patterns of labor supply and demand. One way this can be 
done is to model labor supply to economic sectors as segregated along gender lines, reflecting 
women’s greater responsibility for care activities as well as the tendency to segregate women in 
labor-intensive export activities in the productive sector.  
Macro models that recognize gendered job allocation give some insight into the 
conditions required to make higher wages compatible with growth. Blecker and Seguino (2002), 
for example, model output and growth in an export-oriented semi-industrialized economy. In 
this two-sector model, female labor is used to produce export goods and male workers are 
concentrated in the nontradables sector (The model does not consider the care economy). Higher 
relative female wages could stimulate aggregate consumption (assuming female workers have a 
higher propensity to consume than capitalists), thereby producing a demand-side stimulus. But 
those higher wages will also cause export prices to rise, in which case export demand declines. 
14 Alternatively, higher wages will squeeze profits in that sector, resulting in a decline in sectoral 
investment. This is especially likely in labor-intensive industries in which “footloose” firms find 
it easier to relocate to lower-wage sites. The negative demand-side effect of higher female 
wages on exports and investment is likely to be larger than the potential consumption stimulus, 
especially if exports are price elastic. As a result, higher female wages in such an economy are 
deflationary. 
 
(b) State-Level Development Strategies 
Given these constraints, state-level policy can be used to attenuate the deflationary impact of 
higher female wages. This can be partially achieved by incentives to firms to shift the 
production mix in female-dominated labor- intensive industries produce exports with a low 
price elasticity of demand (e.g., where quality matters). Higher female wages in that case reduce 
the negative effect on export demand. Further, in economies that are articulated, that is, where 
export goods are also domestically consumed, higher female wages may stimulate consumption 
demand, offsetting the decline in export demand. Both of these possibilities imply the need for 
an industrial/agricultural development strategy to promote both articulation and an export 
product mix that permits rising female wages without a (large) negative effect on exports.   
To make gender equity compatible with growth in an open economy also requires 
boundaries on the behavior of firms, and in particular, limits on physical capital mobility 
(inward and outward FDI). Policies to slow the speed at which firms “run” from higher wages 
allows for the possibility that wage hikes can stimulate productivity growth, either because 
firms make greater efforts to achieve efficiency by investing in technological improvements, or 
because workers are induced to be more productive as a result.  
In the first case, incentives structures that force firms to respond to higher wages by 
investing in technological improvements cause investment to rise rather than fall as wages rise, 
thus producing a demand-side stimulus.
28 There may be limits on the effectiveness of this type 
of policy in labor-intensive industries in which women are employed, given that technological 
frontiers will eventually be reached, thus prohibiting firms from further overcoming higher 
wage costs with technological improvements. Nevertheless, evidence from a number of semi-
industrialized economies suggests that there can be a positive wage-investment-productivity 
nexus over some range of wages and technological level. 
15  Absent a positive effect of wages on investment, efficiency wage effects of higher 
wages may emerge when FDI is less mobile. This implies that unit labor costs stay constant and 
may even fall when wages rise.
29 In this case, competitiveness is not hampered by higher wages, 
and export and aggregate demand do not fall. Inward FDI might also be restricted to strategic 
industries and excluded from others for some period of time, giving domestic firms the 
opportunity to gain competitiveness, with the state using its leverage to assist firms to raise 
productivity in response to higher wages.  
Managing FDI is possible, even in a globalized economic environment. As Chang 
(1998) notes, multinational corporations are willing to accommodate restrictive policies so long 
as changes are predictable and announced in advance. Moreover, FDI tends to be influenced by 
the political and economic climate, the quality of the government bureaucracy that implements 
policy, and financial and exchange rate policies. Policies that stabilize the economy, including 
capital controls that act as speed bumps, can reduce volatility and may attract FDI.  
Portions of the strategy outlined here have been effectively implemented in several 
countries. South Korea, for example, has successfully moved up the industrial ladder, relying 
heavily on state intervention. It used a variety of tools to discipline and support “immobile” 
domestic firms to increase their productivity as they moved into targeted strategic industries 
(FDI was greatly restricted). Firms that wanted access to government subsidies and other 
benefits were required to increase exports. With rising wages and limited mobility, the only 
alternative to escape the profit squeeze was for firms to raise productivity, even in labor-
intensive industries where the potential for productivity gains was thought to be limited. The 
result was a rise in wages that stimulated investment and productivity growth (Seguino 1999-
2000). As a result, employment expanded even as wages rose. Singapore, a country with a much 
larger share of FDI in investment, also attempted to raise wages in the mid-1980s. The goal was 
to stimulate multinationals to shift to more capital-intensive production methods and to thereby 
raise productivity. This would have ratified wage increases, but this effort failed due to the 
mobility of firms, many of which simply relocated to lower cost sites in Asia (Huff 1995).  
South Korea’s strategy was built on the premise that state intervention is required to 
stimulate productivity and to move the economy into higher value-added industries.
30 This 
strategy is time-consuming for private firms to underwrite without government support, and thus 
is otherwise unlikely to be undertaken. These policies were accompanied by state investment in 
education, technology, and support of research and development—public sector spending that 
16 “crowded in” private investment, raising profitability by increasing productivity. Restrictions on 
FDI made it easier for the state to discipline as well as reward firms, and to nurture domestic 
capital, with pressure on these firms to share their gains with workers in the form of higher 
wages.  
None of these conditions implies the need to close the economy to trade and investment, 
but they do highlight the importance of managing these, a policy approach that we could label 
“industrial policy under conditions of strategic openness”—openness that is managed to achieve 
specific development and growth goals that serve the broader goal of achieving gender equity. 
Industrial and agricultural development policies would have to be accompanied by 
compatible monetary policies. Because low wages for women substitute for currency 
devaluation, a crawling peg that adjusts for rising female wages can offset the negative effect on 
aggregate demand in cases where devaluations are not contractionary. Devaluations also close 
the gender wage gap in that real male wages fall (since some consumption goods are imported 
and are now more costly).
31 This topic has been relatively unexplored, but here we point to the 
importance of incorporating gender equity goals in the formulation of monetary policy.  
In sum, for a country to reorient export and investment to support equity with growth 
requires an expanded role for government in managing economic outcomes. This is particularly 
the case with regard to assisting or prodding domestic firms to move into the production of more 
price inelastic export goods or services, and using investment and trade policy to encourage 
articulation. There are a variety of tools at the disposal of the domestic economy to promote 
greater equity. These include the use of state policies to promote technology acquisition and 
educational attainment; the use of fiscal resources to provide a more equitable social safety net 
for women; public investment in infrastructure that reduces women’s time spent in unpaid labor; 
and legislation that facilitates male participation in caring labor. Minimum wages and labor 
standards can also improve women’s wages and working conditions, including those in informal 
employment. These strategies need to be coupled by technical support to small and medium 
sized businesses to raise productivity.
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(c) Collective Action at the International Level 
There are a number of external constraints that would need to be overcome as well in order to 
achieve higher rates of growth induced by rising wages and productivity. The poorest countries 
have the weakest power vis-à-vis multinationals because their enticement is primarily low 
17 wages. Bargaining strength of these countries may be enhanced by regionally coordinated 
industrial policies. For example, the Caribbean has a locational advantage as a tourism 
destination, but many of the benefits of this type of activity flow to multinational tourism firms. 
A coordinated Caribbean tourism policy would allow countries to collectively bargain for higher 
regional wages and greater backward linkages to local economies, for example, in local sourcing 
for food purchases. Without a locational advantage with which to bargain, it may be that poor 
countries are constrained to permit inward FDI that capitalizes on low wages.  
Second, a change in policies and rules emanating from the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and trade agreements is needed to permit special and differential treatment for 
developing countries that allow the use of national-level tools to influence the direction and rate 
of economic growth. These include support for strategic industries, protection of infant 
industries, and implementation of rules on foreign direct investment beneficial to domestic firms 
and productivity growth.
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The achievement of gender equality is also dependent on demand expansion in 
industrialized economies which, however, has slowed appreciably since the 1970s. Further, 
income inequality has risen in those economies, suggesting an additional demand-side constraint 
on the growth of developing economies. While open economies are more likely to be profit-led, 
the global economy can be viewed as a closed wage-led economic system. The declining 
income of those at the bottom of the distribution in industrialized economies has reduced 
demand for manufactured or primary commodity exports from developing economies—goods 
that higher income groups are less likely to consume. To rectify this, redistributive policies in 
the north coupled with coordination of expansionary macroeconomic policies could stimulate 
northern demand for southern goods, thus permitting greater growth of (female) wages in the 
south. 
 
5. ARE WE ALL (POST-)KEYNESIANS NOW? 
 
The feminist-Kaleckian macroeconomic analysis advanced here shares a great deal with post-
Keynesian perspectives: the recognition of imperfect markets, an “arthritic” invisible hand, the 
central role of the state in managing an otherwise unstable economy, and chronic excess 
capacity. Feminist analysis distinguishes itself, though, by linking income inequality to output 
and growth, à la Kalecki, but via the gender distribution of income—between classes and within 
18 classes. Further, attention to gender expands the intellectual vision to include the unpaid 
economy. Women’s responsibility for this unpaid work, feminists argue, is a source of their 
relative lack of bargaining power within the paid economy. Class inequality might be reduced 
by a redistribution of income, but gender equity requires more extensive conditions (including, 
but not limited to, greater access to jobs that pay high wages) for an equitable distribution of 
power to obtain within the household. Thus the sites of inequality are dual, lying within the 
unpaid as well as the paid sector.  
In this paper, we link gender inequality to economic structure, and suggest that achieving 
greater equality requires a structural shift from an export-dependent low-wage economy to one 
in which the production mix and policy shifts such that female wages are a stimulus to output 
and employment. That is, a key to overcoming the profit-led character of developing economies 
is to lessen reliance on cheap female labor, which currently serves to relax the balance of 
payments constraint. 
Many policy prescriptions advanced here are echoed in the post-Keynesian literature—
controls on financial capital, the developmental state, fiscal and monetary policy to pursue full 
employment, greater reliance on domestic demand (Pollin 2002). To this, feminist-Kaleckian 
approaches add a broader understanding of power and wage determination. Further, this analysis 
underscores that without targeted policies—in labor markets, industrial and agricultural 
development strategies, and in provision of a social safety net and other policies to support 
caring labor —gender-blind post-Keynesian policies may reduce male class inequality but are 
likely to leave intact gender inequality. Thus, as we argue here, redistributive macroeconomic 
polices and development strategies, to be successful, must take account of gender. 
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
How do we raise women’s well-being in export industries while at the same time promoting 
economic growth? This paper presents an answer to that question, arguing for a heightened role 
for the state in managing the economy in controlling physical and financial capital flows, and 
setting industrial or agricultural policy. Country-specific development policies will differ 
depending on the structure of the economy, the nature of gender employment segregation, and 
human capital differences. Nevertheless, the basic goal is to provide a policy framework that: 1) 
allows productivity to rise in female-dominated industries; 2) promotes strategic industries 
19 which can afford to pay high wages to workers; and 3) allows pursuit of full employment 
through demand-side management policies.  
In this context, macroeconomic policies could include restrictions on physical capital 
mobility in a way that constrains firms to upgrade rather than run from higher wages. A non-
exhaustive list of corollary policies include state-level investments in education and health that 
are gender-enabling, expenditures that permit women and men to combine paid and unpaid 
work, capital controls, and gender-sensitive monetary policy.  
It seems a radical notion to propose increased state intervention in the economy at a time 
when political pressures are in the opposite direction. It seems even more unlikely that 
individual countries, especially small, poor countries, will be able to effectively challenge the 
winds of economic and trade liberalization. That said, there is no need for those concerned with 
economic and social equity to be paralyzed into inaction. Action at home to encourage debate 
on gender equitable proposals is the first step in stimulating debate beyond domestic borders. 
This may eventually lead to broad consensus at the international level, be it within international 
bodies or in regional organizations.  
These proposals, if they achieve the desired results, would fundamentally alter power 
relations. They stand in opposition to current trends that limit the possibility for increasing 
women’s bargaining power. Nevertheless, the improvement in women’s status—now an 
internationally-recognized Millennium Development Goal adopted by 170 governments —has 
the potential to alter unequal gender relations and may be met with resistance. That conflict can 
be lessened if the economic pie is expanding so that women’s access to resources does not come 
solely from a reduction in the material resources going to men. We can also hope that gender 
norms and stereotypes change along the way such that economic goals include a greater 
emphasis on the achievement of well-being for women and the families they care for. 
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1 This paper does not deal directly with change in other arenas, especially the political.  On the role of greater 
equity in the distribution of material resources to promote gender equity, see Rae Lesser Blumberg (1988). For 
further discussion of the notion of people-centered development, as this approach is frequently called, see UNDP 
(1997) and Elson and Cagatay (2000).  
 
2 In the case of self-employment, including on-farm employment, we imply the need for gender equity in access 
and control over income. 
 
3 Elson and Cagatay (2000) label this the “transformatory” approach insofar as the goal of policy is to alter a given 
set of gender relations and distribution of resources to promote greater equity. 
 
4 It is useful to think of the nontradables as fix-price industries where goods are priced with a fixed mark-up over 
unit costs due to oligopolistic structure and chronic excess capacity. The tradables sector is analogous to a flex-
price market, where prices are set with a flexible mark-up that responds to changes in the real exchange rate. An 
important gender difference is that goods produced in the nontradables sector also have lower price elasticity of 
demand than export goods, due to relatively fewer substitutes.  
  
5 The feminization of labor in the manufacturing sector may be a developing country phenomenon. Kucera and 
Milberg (2000), for example, find evidence of declines in female share of manufacturing employment in a number 
of industrialized economies in response to increased north-south trade. That is, women employed in the formal 
manufacturing sector in the north have been displaced in response to increased trade with southern countries that 
are more intensively using women in labor-intensive industries. 
 
6  It would be interesting to explore the process of defeminization and whether the rate of defeminization has been 
lower in some countries (i.e., South Korea) than in others.  This has implications for trends in the gender wage gap. 
 
7 Countries that export unprocessed primary products (e.g., ores) do not fit the stylized facts that we present here. 
First, exports have not expanded as a share of GDP to the extent they have in other developing economies. Also, 
these industries tend to be male-dominated, such that any expansion of output is likely to benefit male workers in 
employment and wages (Fontana 2002). Liberalization has, however, had negative effects on women’s employment 
and income in these economies, in part through loss of manufacturing jobs, but also due to pressures on the state to 
reduce expenditures, resulting in a disproportionately large loss of female jobs.  
 
8 The sex trade is also one of the fastest growing and most profitable service industries; see Williams (1999).   
 
9  Moreover, unemployment data are of limited significance in low-income economies where the majority of the 
population engages in some form of economic activity—usually informal employment or self-employment. 
 
10 For a description of unemployment measurement in several Caribbean economies, see Seguino (2004). 
 
11 This occurs, despite the reliance on service exports to fuel growth in the region. Evidence indicates that during 
economic upturns the gender gap in unemployment rates widens as men are hired first, suggesting that capital’s 
preference for cheap labor is mitigated by patriarchal norms that give men first access to jobs  (Seguino 2004).    
 
12 This phrase is from Samarasinghe (1998) in reference to trends in Sri Lanka. It is clearly, however, a process that 
extends beyond Sri Lanka to many developing economies. 
 
13 On this topic, see Fernandez-Kelly and Sassen (1993), Carr, Chen, and Tate (2000), Sayeed and Balakrishnan 
(2002), and Balakrishnan (2002). 
 
14 This bias results in women being treated as though their earnings are supplementary while men are assumed to 
have the right to jobs whose pay is regular and where there is upward mobility. 
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15 In agriculture, health hazards associated with working with chemical pesticides further dampen the positive 
employment effects (Dolan, Humphrey, and Harris-Pascal 1999; Thrupp, Bergeron, and Waters 1995). Some recent 
studies note that some progress has been made on labor conditions and on women’s empowerment (Newman 2000; 
Stephen 2000). Nevertheless, work conditions are relatively harsh and prospects for advancement are limited. 
 
16 Oostendorp (2002) finds evidence of declining gaps in wages within occupational categories in tradables 
industries, but not in nontradables, based on data from the ILO October survey, noting, however, the extensive 
problems with this data set that makes it “one of the least-used sources of cross country data in the world” (2002: 
5). These data weaknesses and the standardization procedure used to convert earnings to monthly wages raise 
questions about the reliability of the results.  
 
17 A second case of women’s increased earnings from, NTAEs is Vietnam. Trade liberalization and a reduction in 
government subsidies for modern health care (Sowerine 1999) led to increased demand for medicinal plants. This 
has had a positive effect on women’s income since they are dominant along the chain of production of medicinal 
plants. Again, however, this partial equilibrium perspective is overshadowed by broader evidence suggesting that 
gender inequality has increased in Vietnam (Long et al. 2000).  
 
18 This result differs from industrialized economies such as the U.S. where men have been concentrated in import 
competing industries, such as autos and steel, and have also faced “threat effects” of corporate relocation. Since 
men were disproportionately employed in these industries, the result has been a narrowing of the gender wage gap 
but in a gender conflictive sense, whereby men’s wages have fallen significantly and women’s have risen slightly 
(Mishel and Bernstein 1999). Black and Brainerd (2002) attribute this to increased trade competition which forces 
firms to give up their discriminatory hiring practices to employ female labor, thus driving up women’s relative 
wages. Kongar (2004) contradicts this explanation, instead attributing the narrowing gender wage gap in 
concentrated U.S. industries to firms’ ability to extract wage concessions from male workers, at the same time 
laying off female workers in low productivity occupations, thus raising the average wage of remaining female 
workers. Import competition and the decline of job opportunities for males thus resulted in a greater supply of 
males willing to work for lower wages, thereby decreasing the cost of discrimination. These results imply a relative 
decline in female manufacturing employment, a finding consistent with Kucera and Milberg (2000).  
 
19Some recent studies show, however, that when gender equality is measured in terms of education, equity 
stimulates growth (Hill and King 1995; Klasen 1999; Dollar and Gatti 1999). The causal mechanisms are several. 
Gender inequalities in education and access to other productive resources create inefficiencies. Further, women’s 
greater education enhances household bargaining power that can improve children’s access to resources, thus 
enhancing the quality of the future labor supply and economy-wide productivity.  These results are not necessarily 
inconsistent with Seguino (2000a and 2000c) whose empirical analysis is focused on the short- and medium-run. 
Increase in female education relative to men can raise their relative productivity. But if women lack the bargaining 
power to translate that productivity into higher wages, unit labor costs and thus export prices fall and/or firm profits 
rise. Employers and foreign buyers thus appropriate gains in women’s education. 
  
20 Conversely, horizontal FDI is motivated by the desire to gain access to a domestic market to avoid import 
restrictions or local content requirements, or reduce transport costs. In such a case, labor costs have a smaller 
negative effect on inward FDI. 
 
21 Proponents of liberalization argue that efficiency is promoted as investment funds flow from surplus economies, 
where marginal rates of return are low to economies with higher marginal productivity of investment, thereby 
stimulating investment and growth worldwide. Felix (1998) challenges this view, arguing that higher interest rates 
dampen investment and slow economic growth, and economic inefficiency.  
 
22 This occurs between countries and within countries, such as the United States where individual states compete 
for investment by lowering corporate tax burdens. 
 
23 Elson and Cagatay (2000) note also the trend to commodify state-based entitlements, with health, retirement, and 
education pushed into the market realm, available to those whose incomes are sufficient to cover the costs. 
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24 While agricultural and semi-industrialized economies differ structurally, there are some commonalities related to 
their susceptibility to external factors, according to Erturk (2001-02). Semi-industrialized economies are attempting 
“immiserizing growth” which results from over-reliance on low-tech manufacturing goods that have taken on the 
pricing characteristics of primary commodities—that is, with declining terms of trade. The emergence of new 
producers of these homogenous goods had led to a crisis of overproduction, causing export prices to fall. This has 
led to competitive devaluations and pressured firms to lower costs or relocate to lower wage sites. 
 
25 These unpaid labor burdens are costly in terms of foregone income. For example, in Tanzania, a reduction of 
women’s time burdens in providing basic commodities to their households was found to raise cash incomes 10 
percent, labor productivity 15 percent, and capital efficiency 44 percent on smallholder farms (Blackden and Bhanu 
1999).  
   
26 We are grateful to Nilufer Cagatay for this point.  
27 See Blecker (2002) and Setterfield (2003) for excellent reviews of research in this area.  
 
28 Evidence of a positive relationship between wages and investment can be found in a variety of contexts. See, for 
example, Seguino (1999-2000) on South Korea, and Marquetti (forthcoming) for a variety of industrialized 
countries. 
  
29 If unit labor costs stay the same, of course, then this is not a case of wage-led growth in the classic demand-
driven sense. But it is wage led in the supply side sense, whereby higher wages stimulate productivity 
improvements, attenuating any negative demand side effects that might result from a decline in profits. 
 
30 For further discussion of this strategy and the theory behind it, see Amsden (1998). 
 
31 There are constraints on the effectiveness of exchange rates to lead to a closure of the gender wage gap, however. 
Currency devaluations can be inflationary in economies in which imports are rigid and are a large share of GDP. 
This can dampen export demand, and will lower women’s real wages. Further, financial markets may respond 
negatively to anticipated inflation in response to a currency devaluation, leading to rising interest rates, bankruptcy, 
and deflation. Thus women may gain in terms of higher wages relative to men, but they may also suffer 
employment losses so that the female share of the wage bill falls. Also, unless supply schedules are elastic, it may 
be difficult to shift resources to the export sector. For more on the limits of devaluation to promote output growth, 
see, for example, Panic (1998).  
 
32 Higher minimum wages may be beneficial, even in open export-oriented economies (Rama, 2001; Saget 2001). 
Rama (2001) found, for example, that a doubling of the nominal minimum wage in Indonesia in the early 1990s 
resulted in some negative effects on employment. While large firms saw employment rise, small and medium firms 
experienced declines in employment, which may be a result of their inability to respond to higher wages with 
productivity-increasing measures.  
 
33 Many would agree that a shift in the IMF policy framework is also required to permit developing countries to 
manage financial capital flows, thus allowing domestic interest rates to fall. In addition, an end to the IMF’s push 
for contractionary policies in response to balance of payments crises as a way to slow imports is needed. Further, 
the emergence of an international lender of last resort in times of balance of payments crises would reduce 
pressures on domestic economies to maintain high levels of reserves and interest rates that slow growth. These 
stances have been broadly discussed, but the engine of change in this case seems to rest more on political power 
than economic analysis. 
 
30 